Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, vol. 52, no. 1, February–March 2010, pp. 111–136
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North Korean behaviour that appears intended to raise tensions with Pyongyang’s adversaries is not only vexing but puzzling. The North Koreans periodically throw up obstacles to the economic cooperation their country desperately needs, including harassment of the joint North–South industrial zone in Kaesong. Pyongyang often speaks as if it welcomes a fight with the United States and South Korea, its strongest potential adversaries. With its second nuclear test in May 2009, Pyongyang clearly angered even its important partner China, a major supplier of such basic needs as food and energy. If fear of aggression by the United States and its allies is a principal driver of North Korean foreign policy, why do the North Koreans frequently risk providing the putatively aggressive Americans further motivation to attack? Some observers argue, for example, that transfer of nuclear material or technology is extremely unlikely because Pyongyang is deterred from crossing what is clearly a red line for the United States that would bring massive military retaliation. Yet North Korean officials have more than once threatened to cross that line, seemingly for the purpose of frightening the Americans by playing on one of their worst fears.
There are several possible explanations for Pyongyang’s provocative behaviour, and they imply different policy responses for North Korea’s neighbours. The first theory is that the leaders of North Korea are irrational or desperate, and their actions are strategically senseless. If this is the case, other Asia-Pacific governments will be unable to surmount their disagreements with Pyongyang through agreements and cooperation. They must also expect and prepare for hyper-aggressive and even suicidal North Korean policies. A second common view holds that North Korean leaders believe they need an external enemy for domestic political purposes. They therefore engage in self-alienation to ensure continual tensions with the outside world. According to this view Pyongyang will never give up its nuclear weapons or reconcile with its adversaries. A third theory is that fomenting crises serves two basic North Korean objectives: security and extracting concessions. Pyongyang believes the risks of a tension-raising policy are acceptable given the potential rewards and the lack of other options.
Has North Korea gone crazy?
The canard that Pyongyang’s is a ‘crazy’ regime, rejected by most serious analysts of North Korea, is alive and well in the media and well entrenched among the public. Hence we find headlines such as ‘Why North Korea is so Crazy’ and ‘Has North Korea Gone Crazy?’ in publications such as Time and The Economist. This notion would not be worth discussing, except for the fact that it continues to influence US policymaking. American officials, particularly members of Congress (including influential senators who sit on important committees), typically describe the North Korean government in terms such as ‘reckless’, ‘unpredictable’, ‘rogue’, ‘erratic’, ‘belligerent’ and ‘unstable’. These terms are highly suggestive of, if not synonymous with, irrationality, especially the notion of unpredictability. Arizona Senator Jon Kyl has said that ‘the regime’s behavior has become increasingly belligerent and unpredictable’. Kyl’s Arizona colleague John McCain describes…
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Denny Roy is a Senior Research Fellow, East-West Center, Honolulu, Hawaii.
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