Svetlana Soboleva, Professor and Senior Researcher, the Institute of Economics and Industry, Russian Academy of Sciences, Novosibirsk, Russia
Migration has traditionally been an important factor in determining the structure of Siberia’s population. Throughout the twentieth century there were several periods in which significant changes occurred in regard to the number of inhabitants in Siberia. One of the most momentous events was the agrarian-reform programme of Russian Prime Minister Peter Stolypin (1906–11), during which the region’s rural population was established and the foundations were laid for future population reproduction in Siberia. From the mid-1920s until the end of the 1930s, the region felt the impact of industrialisation, forced collectivisation and ultimately the Second World War. It was at this time that there were mass deportations of people and the relocation of huge industrial enterprises from the front to this region. Different ethnic groups, especially Russian Germans, were forcibly deported during the first few years of the war.
1970–85 was the last time in the twentieth century that there was a significant rise in the number of residents in Western Siberia. It was during this period that the average annual population growth rate was greater than 15 (new residents or migrants) per 1,000 (members of the population). This increase can be explained by the influx of Russians from other regions to work on a new oil-processing complex in Western Siberia. Even when the birth rate was high (20 or 25 births per 1,000), natural growth accounted for less than 40% of total population growth. Furthermore, natural growth of the working-age population constituted only some 5% of total population growth for all people of working age due to the influx of foreign workers.
Migration since the mid-1990s is fulfilling a very important demographic function in stabilising the number of inhabitants not only in Siberia, but also in Russia as a whole. It is well known that it is exclusively thanks to new immigrants mainly from the former Soviet republics during 1992–2000, that the total population decrease in Russia was (according to demographers’ estimates) 2% which is half of what it would have been had there been no foreign migrants. The demographic crisis in Siberia – the natural population growth rate is now negative – means that migration is becoming increasingly important, and, in the long term, will remain the main determinant of the region’s population structure. The importance of economic migrants as a proportion of all migrants will also prove significant in future, as natural population growth of working-age people will also change from positive to negative from 2004–06. This trend will continue for some time due to the falling birth rate of the past 15 years.
The nature of contemporary migration is complex and takes many forms. Besides the movement of people from rural to urban locations, other trends include migration from the relatively over populated northern parts of Western Siberia, ecological migration, emigration of the intellectual élite and highly qualified personnel, forced migration mainly from the Central Asian states, and international migration of labour. Over the past few years, the latter two types of migration (which are new to Siberia) have been, and will continue to be, the major factors determining economic migration and the structure of the Siberian workforce. Consequently, a completely new approach is required, which will involve the drafting of new legislation and institutional restrictions.
Over 70% of those who were forced to migrate to Siberia have settled in and around Novosibirsk oblast, Kemerovo oblast and Altai krai. These people are now the main source of growth in the labour force in large towns and regional centres. Since many of those migrating from Central Asia are well educated, they are finding it easier to acquire work and housing in the urbanised regions of Western Siberia than migrants in central Russia, who, as a rule, compete with local inhabitants for jobs and accommodation. Furthermore, legislation has been passed in the regions of Western Siberia to provide forced migrants with assistance on arrival, including housing.
65–80% of all forced migrants are of working age, which is a higher proportion than the percentage of working-age people in Siberia’s population. There are also many children and teenagers among the forced migrants, which is lowering the average age of Siberia’s population.
Acquisition of Russian citizenship was the main motivation for migrants departing the former Soviet republics and heading to Siberia in the early 1990s (after the Soviet Union’s collapse). Other reasons were the yearning to return to their historical homeland and to be reunited with relatives, as well as rising unemployment in their home countries. Towards the end of the 1990s, the main reasons for emigrating changed and are now, for example, the desire to create a better future for their children and to advance their own career prospects, an increase in the retirement age in Kazakhstan, and the higher standard of living in Russia.
The education levels of immigrants from the former Soviet republics are higher than those of Siberians as a whole. This is especially true for the period between 1992 and 1997, which witnessed the first forced resettlement programmes. Forced migrants are also very well educated in comparison with migrants more generally. Their educational levels are reflected in their professional profiles. A large percentage is civil servants, well-qualified specialists in the areas of education, public health, culture and science, for instance. On the one hand, this can help them to find work on arrival in Siberia, but, on the other, it can be problematic in terms of adapting to their new surroundings. Difficulties involved in finding work lead many migrants to take jobs that do not match their educational or professional qualifications. The educational and professional potential of those migrating to Siberia is not being tapped efficiently. This is one of the factors hindering a smooth or quick adaptation process. It is also delaying development of Siberia’s human-resource potential and hence future economic growth.
Socio-political problems linked to migration are becoming all the more poignant and real due to the scale of migration. These problems affect not only Siberia, but also the migrants’ home regions. Mass migration leads to a huge drain of qualified specialists, which has serious socio-economic and political consequences for Central Asia. The economic situation in this region is worsening, there are labour shortages in some sectors, the social fabric is being torn apart, and the diaspora population is dwindling.
Migration patterns in the last decade of the twentieth century are different from those of the past not only in terms of the number of migrants but also in relation to the psychological stress and social pain that they endure. Families have been separated, dreams shattered and people who have been forced to make this difficult decision have suffered psychological trauma. Although research carried out in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan indicates that there has been a slight drop in the number of immigrants coming to Siberia, more people intend to migrate. There is enough evidence to show that the potential for migration is great. Other than Russian speakers migrating from all of the former Soviet Central Asian republics, a steady flow of migrants from northern Kazakhstan to Russia, including Siberia, is to be expected.
Over the past few years there has also been an influx of people migrating of their own volition from China, Korea and Vietnam to Siberia and Russia’s Far East, whether legally or illegally, or on a permanent or temporary basis. Legal immigrants are subject to migration controls, but numbers are increasing every year. They are of three main types: workers from China; students; and traders. Research conducted in the various regions of the Far East and Eastern Siberia, as well as in Khabarovsk and Primorskii krai and the Amur and Irkutsk oblasts, indicates that most Chinese immigrants are businessmen acting independently. A number of them have been hugely successful, although far from all plan to remain in Russia. So far, Chinese migrants have not re-balanced negative population growth in Siberia. There are isolated instances of Chinese becoming naturalised Russians. This is not because they want to, however: they would rather keep their Chinese citizenship, as opposed to settling in Russia permanently. These migrants usually send their children back to China to stay with relatives and do not deny that the only reason they have come to Russia is to earn money. Official data show that there has been an increase in the number of registered marriages between Russians and Chinese. No research, though, has been carried out on this, so it is impossible to say whether the rise in the number of mixed marriages reflects a changing profile of family life in the region or whether these are fictitious marriages entered into by economic migrants seeking to legalise their presence in Russia.
Many factors explain why there has been a mass exodus from China to Siberia:
demographic pressure;
the socio-economic imbalance between Russia and China;
Chinese-government restrictions in regard to demographic policy;
a surplus of Chinese labour, outnumbering job vacancies;
a high level of unemployment in China; and
the China–Russia border is relatively easy to cross.
Research on China’s internal development predicts that migration from China will increase regardless of any socio-economic progress in the country.
Meanwhile, Russia is experiencing an increase in the migration of foreigners, including those from the titular nationalities of the former Soviet Republics (Kazakhs from Kazakhstan and Uzbeks from Uzbekistan, rather than Russians from those republics) due to the relaxation of immigration controls. Furthermore, the number of migrants arriving illegally from the former Soviet republics is rising and some intend to use Russia as a transit point before moving on to a third country. Even today, it is impossible to provide an accurate estimate of the number of illegal workers entering Russia, since the authorities do not (or cannot) count them. There is a constant stream of shuttle traders, small traders and moonlighters, among others, which appears to be continuing unregulated.
This uncontrolled influx of migrants has intensified competition between migrants and other ethnic and social groups for jobs, housing and consumer goods. It has also had a negative effect on political stability between different ethnic groups in Eurasia. The increase in the number of immigrants has also been accompanied by a rise in criminal activity, which is damaging Russia’s interests and endangering its security. Numerous economic and socio-economic problems have manifested as a result: capital has left the region (Chinese profits are repatriated), there have been incidences of ‘dumping’ on the labour market, and the services and consumer-goods markets and the light-industry sector are suffering as a consequence of cheap Chinese imports. In addition, there have been various infringements of economic regulations, such as tax evasion, smuggling, and illegal trade operations. There is also a practice of forming a company in 24 hours or using a figurehead ostensibly to conduct foreign trade but really as a front for criminal bartering schemes.
It is perhaps inevitable that the migration process brings with it some illegal and criminal elements, but crime is causing major problems for the communities into which immigrants have settled, for the government and for the migrants themselves. Large-scale law breaking is undermining the fundamentals of a law-based state. Local authorities have been corrupted to the highest degree on all levels and federal and local budgets have suffered huge material losses. Furthermore, a large number of people (the illegal migrants) are deprived of state protection and have thus sought the protection of local and international criminals.
Lack of socio-cultural integration between the migrants and local residents in their new home region may well pose a serious threat to stability and law and order. This is also due to the reserve of the new arrivals and their sense of estrangement. The reputation that members of migrant communities have for being criminals is certainly a major point of conflict and remains a problem regardless of whether the accusations are true or not.
One of the most important issues stemming from illegal economic migration is the migrants’ lack of social protection. Essentially, they have no rights and the arbitrary nature of the attitude of law-enforcement agencies and employers towards them is notorious.
It is well known that, over the past few years, Central Asia has become one of the most active transit zones for illegal immigrants from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and elsewhere who are heading for Russia and then on to Western Europe. The reason is that, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, control along Russia’s borders with Central Asian countries has become lax and there is a certain degree of ‘openness’ or transparency at some of the most strategic points. Another explanation is that this region is a geographically convenient bridge to the West.
At present, according to some estimates, there are 1.5 million migrants in Russia who have come from Central Asia, many of whom intend to make their way to Western Europe. 80% are from Asia, while 17% are from Africa. 60% of those illegal migrants arriving in Russia from Asia have come from former Soviet republics, mainly those in Central Asia.
The current absence of regulation and control over the influx of migrants will undoubtedly make the labour, housing and consumer-goods markets increasingly unstable. It should be possible to avoid these problems, however, by devising and implementing the relevant institutional foundation. Siberia should endeavour to put an end to the spontaneous nature of the migration process and replace it with a legalised system based on the rule of law, which makes effective use of migrants. The new process should be based on the realistic understanding that foreign migration is not only unavoidable but, in fact, is also essential for the region’s development. This process, though, will entail great risks, which must be planned for in advance. It is necessary to prepare the community, shape public opinion and create the legislative and institutional basis for a new migration policy. The following initiatives should be included in the strategy:
- A research programme should be set up to monitor thoroughly and to check constantly on migration. Its main purpose should be to study how migrants adapt to their life in a new community.
- Migrants with a wide range of professional backgrounds should be encouraged to transfer to the region, and competition on the labour market for foreign workers should be stimulated.
- Flexible, comprehensive and consistent legislation concerning migration needs to be introduced and the relevant institutions must become more efficient at implementing it.
- The division of responsibility for regulating migration between central and local government must be clarified.
The state should protect the rights of foreign migrants as citizens and workers.
Illegal immigrants and government deputies who break the law should be made answerable for their crimes.
Work done by foreign workers should be legalised as much as possible. This would allow the state to control the situation, collect taxes and reduce (to a socially acceptable level) the number of corrupt officials and criminal immigrant gangs.
