Klaus Becher
Helmut Schmidt Senior Fellow for European Security, IISS
The term ‘soft security’, at the time of East–West detente, was originally used to distinguish military issues from other relevant security issues, including such military-related issues as confidence-building measures and arms control. The subsequent widening of the notion of security has added environmental themes, transnational risks and security challenges, plus a wide spectrum of economic, social and political factors that affect the prospects for enhanced security through ‘stability export’ and transformation. ‘Soft security’ is thus apparently about almost everything except defence proper. In this sense, it is not really a term of practical value.
A different distinction may be more significant: that between those issues that can be properly dealt with between governments; and those issues, often of a technical nature, that need also to be effectively addressed on a local and regional level across national borders. When I speak of soft security, I therefore mean those issues that involve mainly technical, organisational, administrative or informational interaction on the working level and are not in essence elements of the ‘high’ politics best addressed in formal diplomatic channels. In this sense, the soft-security agenda opens up a decentralised secondary avenue for international cooperation that in certain circumstances is easier, although not necessarily simple, to pursue.
Issues such as more efficient border and visa regimes fall in this category, but are, of course, not only technical questions. There will always be two elements that need to be brought together. You will need political authority and guidance, and in the end, political decisions; but to get there, it is extremely helpful to let experts and local or regional actors get together on the ground to identify what exactly needs to be changed and what the options are. It is this dual approach that holds the promise for improvement.
This approach also provides a framework for mobilising the financial support often required for addressing soft-security issues, especially through mandates from international governmental frameworks such as the G7/G8, EU cooperation frameworks, or bilateral relations. Here, expression is given to political will that can provide reliable backing for local and regional actors to engage in trans-border interaction in a sustainable way. And here, states must commit financial support to the necessary measures.
On common security challenges, such as nuclear reactor safety and cooperative threat reduction, this approach has worked well. Similarly, this is true for the support provided by EU countries to non-EU members, such Poland, for stepping up their border control regimes and bringing them in tune with Schengen requirements. The same approach can be pursued in the future with other countries, including Russia.
Soft-security issues, in spite of their technical nature, will often assume high political importance. The attacks of 11 September provide a good example, drawing attention to aviation security and immigration controls. At the same time, the transnational nature of many security challenges traditionally been regarded as ‘internal’ has become far more obvious. There is increasing awareness that they cannot be addressed properly within strictly national control, but require international interaction.
The European integration process since the 1950s has often been advanced exactly by such technical issues, which provided a convincing practical rationale for working together in an institutionalised way. In a cooperative political environment, such issues can generate a functional integration impulse. The need to deal successfully with certain issues can override the reluctance of certain nations to cooperate.
Under the impact of the attacks on the US on 11 September 2001, priorities for international interaction have changed for some of the important actors, not only the US. The criteria for international security-policy decisions and action in international security policy have changed. The willingness of other countries and partners to support the US in the struggle against terrorism and related challenges, such as the risk of weapons of mass destruction falling in irresponsible hands, is likely to be the dominant yardstick for measuring the performance of other actors.
The US and others who feel directly affected by the attack of 11 September will have less patience for inefficient and slow multinational diplomacy. There has been a discernable surge in the popularity of bilateralism over multilateralism, although this is certainly not a mid- or long-term answer, from the viewpoint of the international system. New institutional multilateral approaches will probably be formed to focus on the new challenges. The main focus is likely to be on strengthening the institutional ability – nationally, bilaterally and multilaterally – to deal with the new security challenges. Almost every international institution has adjusted its activities and public relations efforts to reflect this need, the best example being NATO’s immediate invocation of Article 5. This reflects the seriousness of what has happened and its impact on the international system.
The world has learned since 11 September that the US is currently the only international actor able to muster a coherent response to this kind of challenge. The EU and others still need to digest this lesson for the mid- and long-term. US dominance in the international system has been strengthened by its ability to lead the coalition in response to the attacks. However, even the US, in many regards, has only a limited ability to respond. For the international security system as a whole, this means that governments must urgently strengthen their ability to act, to streamline their efforts and institutions and, where necessary, work together in innovative ways. This new factor can also provide an additional impulse to the kind of functionalist integration mentioned earlier.
There is an increasing pressure to remove unnecessary obstacles, even though they may have a long and cherished tradition, if they no longer stand up to the test of the new priorities in the changed international security system. There are many examples of countries now feeling that expectations have been stepped up and they have to perform better, focusing on their real concerns without being held up by outdated or marginal complicating factors. This also applies to many of the bureaucratic complications often encountered in dealing with soft security issues, such as overlapping jurisdictions. Homework needs to be done here to adapt structures to the new expectations and be able to act and deliver internationally.
Under the pressure of the prority concern with international terrorism, and by extension, organised crime, it is remarkable that the international sharing of domestic and international intelligence has immediately been stepped up between the US and other countries, notably with Russia. Although traditionally, this field has been a core prerogative of the sovereign state, now it has become possible, under the pressure of the need to deliver results, to cooperate intensively across borders. There is a similar new impulse for cooperation in many other areas. This includes: border management, customs and visa regimes; integrated efficient finance and banking control regimes to fight money laundering and the financing of terrorism; civil-emergency planning and preparedness (a topic on the list of things to be discussed between Russia and NATO); nuclear safety; and public health (not least because it overlaps with the bio-terroism concern).
In the EU and other countries, the populations and political leaderships are beginning to realise that there are threats to their own countries: threats to critical infrastructures, attacks with missiles, biological and chemical weapons, and mass-destruction terror of the kind the US experienced. Typically, this kind of threat can only be dealt with on a multinational level, and with a new mix of internal and external security responses. Within the EU, amazing new dimensions of cooperation have already become possible since 11 September 2001, such as the European arrest warrant that does away with the old requirement for extradition. It is now possible to talk about a European coast guard and border police. This deeper integration in justice and home affairs in response to the new security challenges is not restricted to EU members. In fact, for issues such as border management, it is quite obvious that neighbouring countries ought to be included.
One of the major consequences of 11 September is that Russia is now perceived as a core partner of the international system led by the United States together with the European Union. The thinking that dominated the mid-90s – that a residual threat remained and that Russia's contribution was inherently limited – is no more. Russia is now a key ally, and as far as its actions under President Putin have so far conveyed, it will not miss this opportunity for deepening its cooperation and institutional anchoring. This is a moment of opportunity for soft-security cooperation.
