Russia’s northwestern regions play an increasingly important role in relations between Russia and Europe, which has become one of the main priorities in Russia’s foreign policy. Over the past decade, practically all Russian regions bordering countries of central and western Europe have developed different strategies for cross-border cooperation, ranging from ad hoc dialogue among regional entities on both sides of the border, to more sophisticated models of cross-border integration, such as Euro-regions. Such cross-border cooperation models represent important vehicles for Russia’s gradual integration into the European economic, political and security space. However, the level of cross-border cooperation remains much lower than in other parts of Europe, either within the European Union, or between the EU and the states on its periphery. Moreover, for many Russian regions the benefits of cross-border cooperation do not yet outweigh the costs associated with being a border region. This requires additional resources to develop the regional economy, to address political and security considerations and to negotiate with the federal centre a whole range of policies that used to lie outside the constitutional authority of regional government bodies.
Even this limited level of cross-border relations is now threatened by both domestic and external factors. On one hand, there will be an impact from the federal reforms launched by President Putin aimed at limiting the ‘regionalisation’ process in Russia, which is seen as a challenge to state cohesion and a limitation on the power of central (federal authorities) to implement an ambitious set of economic and social reforms. On the other hand, the forthcoming enlargement of the European Union to include Russia’s neighbours Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania is expected, at least in the short term, to bring more challenges to the northwestern regions.
So far, Russia’s northwestern regions, like the rest of Russia, are not prepared for dealing with the potential consequences of EU enlargement. The Russian government and academic experts have not completed a comprehensive assessment on the effect of the EU enlargement for Russia. This study should focus on the following four areas: what impact the enlargement might have for Russia’s economy (cross-border trade, transit, exports [by sectors], tourism); what changes are required to Russia’s legislation to meet EU standards for environmental, labour and other regulations; what is the size of investment required to improve Russia’s own border, customs, migration and consular services (including issuing passports to Russian citizens and preparing to issue visas for EU citizens from the border states planning to make regular travel into Russia); and finally, how some of these issues can be addressed using technical assistance and other programmes already being implemented between Russia and the EU. The absence of such an assessment for Russia as a whole makes it practically impossible to conduct individual assessments for each of the Russian regions bordering the future EU member states. At the same time, the lack of knowledge among both regional and Moscow-based experts on the EU legislation and the terms of admission agreements for future members, warrant greater cooperation between Russia and the EU in developing studies on this, and producing recommendations for mitigating potential negative consequences of the enlargement.
In addition to EU–Russia dialogue, it is also necessary to improve coordination and strategic planning between Russia’s central government and the northwestern regional administrations (and in some cases, municipalities) to promote sustainable development by leveraging comparative strengths of different regions and by developing key infrastructure and transit routes between northern and central Russia and northeastern Europe. The creation of the North-Western Federal District and appointment of the Presidential Authorised Representative in the district could become a mechanism for such coordination. So far, however, its activities have been focused more on controlling functions vis-à-vis the activities of regional governors and federal bodies in the regions, rather than on the development of a forward-looking strategy for the entire district. As a result, the role of the Plenipotentiary Representative has become one of reinforcing oversight from the centre over the activities of regional governors (including harmonisation of legislation), and not in any way that of a vehicle for regional authorities to convey their proposals and experience to the centre or to other regions within the district. Moreover, political tensions and the unwillingness of some regional governors to recognise the authority of the federal district has often complicated such dialogue. At the same time, the absence of clear authority by the Presidential Plenipotentiary representative over economic policy and over the flow of financial resources between the centre and the regions has minimised any incentives on the part of regional governors to develop closer relations with the Federal District. In the long term, for the Federal District structure to survive as an effective policy tool between the region and the centre, its powers and personnel structure should be changed to make it more beneficial both for the federal authorities and for the regions which it represents.
Another complicating factor for effective centre–regional relations is that Russia has still not adopted a law on the division of powers between the centre and the regions, particularly in the areas which the Russian Constitution places within their joint jurisdiction. Such a law is important not only for economic issues, but also for some areas within foreign/external and security policies. In addition to legislation on the division of powers, it is important to develop a special law covering both powers and distribution of resources for Russia’s border regions. The concept of trans-border cooperation in the Russian Federation was signed by the Prime Minister in February 2001, but so far, it has not lead to legislation that would grant additional powers to border regions for developing trans-border cooperation programmes. The adoption of such legislation, as well as publicising best practices developed by different regions across Russia, represent an urgent task for the Russian government, particularly in light of expanding economic and political ties between Russia and Europe.
In addition to the formal division of powers, it is important to strengthen informal mechanisms for regional participation in the formulation, negotiation and implementation of Russia’s foreign policy. At present this informal dialogue is implemented through two main avenues: the establishment of Ministry of Foreign Affairs missions in the regions, and the inclusion of regional representatives on state commissions and delegations concerning particular foreign-policy issues. These mechanisms are correct, but their efficiency is limited by the lack of resources on both sides, including qualified foreign-policy experts in the regions and regional-issue experts in the foreign ministry. These obstacles could be overcome through educational programmes and by placing diplomats covering regional issues in Russian embassies in European and other countries.
There is an urgent need for the adoption of a district-wide development strategy to focus on the main strategic issues, such as infrastructure development, improving the investment climate, supporting small business ventures, promoting cross-border trade, developing logistics for transit flows and developing tourism. The programme should also address regional security issues such as the development of border infrastructure, demographic problems and migration, public health, illegal smuggling and the environment. The strategy should provide a long-term vision for the entire district and promote its closer economic integration with the European economic and legal space, while supporting the Russian government’s overall priorities for structural reforms. The programme should take into account both the challenges and opportunities presented by EU enlargement and by other EU–Russia agreements (such as the creation of a common economic space or a Russia–EU energy dialogue). And finally, it should establish priorities between different programmes and objectives, and spell out strategies for attracting funding from the Russian government, private investors (both domestic and foreign) and EU technical assistance programmes.
The adoption of a district-wide programme should not restrict the flexibility of regional (oblasts), or even municipalities in some cases, to pursue their own initiatives for promoting cross-border cooperation ranging from investment to grass-roots exchanges. It is also important to encourage regions to take responsibility for dealing with barriers that prevent them from establishing close cooperation with their European neighbours. These should include regional mechanisms for attracting foreign investment (e.g. the Novgorod oblast model) that would simplify administrative procedures for investors and promote special outreach programmes. They should also include bilateral dialogues between regional customs and border officials with their counterparts in Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Lithuania and Finland. Cross-border integration projects such as the Euro-region model should be strongly promoted, including the expansion of existing arrangements and the establishment of new ones. In all these cases, it is important to develop a mechanism for regular exchanges of information (meetings, internet and regional databases) between different regional authorities (administrations, regional legislatures, municipalities, migration services) on regional best practice in cross-border cooperation. It is also important to promote a greater role for NGOs in a regional horizontal exchange of experience among all Russia’s border regions.
Another priority for both Russian and European policy-makers should be to promote better understanding among the northwestern region residents about EU structures and legislation as well as overall developments in Europe in the context of EU and NATO enlargement. This can be done through special education programmes for regional universities and schools. Another strategy is to expand short-term training programmes in Europe under the EU technical assistance for the representatives of regional administrations and municipalities, customs and border officials, lawyers and law enforcement authorities, migration officials, business communities and local press and media. The role of local media in providing public information on the regional level is particularly important. At present, with the exception of Kaliningrad oblast, local media and press provide very little information to the residents of border regions and northwestern regions overall on European issues. At the same time, the lack of information and difficulties with travel (due to visa regimes and financial constraints) is fuelling suspicions towards and misperceptions of Europe and its institutions. The role of NGOs in promoting cross-border ties is equally important and requires more support. It is also important to establish analytical centres in the regions which can provide regular analysis for the regional authorities and for the local public on issues related to Europe. In addition, it is very important to improve regional input in the foreign policy-making process.
