Holger Moroff
Research fellow, Department of Political Science, University of Osnabrück (Germany)
This article has been built upon research conducted within the framework a DFG (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft) project on the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU.
The Northern Dimension (ND) of the EU is a generic term which encompasses all activities of the Union in the Northern Dimension area, whether as part of the enlargement process, as for Poland and the three Baltic republics, or within the European Economic Area, as for Norway and Iceland, or finally and most importantly, as part of its foreign policy towards Russia including its assistance programme Tacis (Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States), the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) and the Union’s Common Strategy on Russia (CSR). It thus forms the brackets around the Union’s soft-security policies in the region.
The Luxembourg European Council in December 1997 endorsed the idea of an EU policy for the Northern Dimension and requested that the Commission prepare an outline for such a policy. In November 1998, an interim report was published as a Commission Communication on a ‘Northern Dimension for the policies of the Union’, identifying six areas where the EU could provide added value, namely, in the fields of energy, environmental and nuclear safety, cross-border cooperation, trade, transport, telecommunications and health. The succeeding Vienna European Council endorsed the report and invited the General Affairs Council of the foreign ministers to prepare guidelines for the implementation of the ND. In June 1999, these guidelines were endorsed at the Cologne European Council and the following policy fields were counted among those for possible EU contribution: natural resources, infrastructure (including transport, telecommunications and energy), environment, nuclear safety, education, research, training, human resources development, public health and social administration. It was agreed to call a ministerial meeting on the ND during the subsequent Finnish presidency. That meeting took place in November 1999 in Helsinki, where member states were represented, along with the seven partner countries, as they are officially called, which are not EU members: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Russian Federation, Poland, Norway and Iceland. An ‘Inventory of current activities under the Northern Dimension’ was adopted, and the Helsinki European Council in December that year asked the Commission to prepare an ‘Action Plan for the Northern Dimension in the external and cross-border policies of the European Union for 2000–03’. This was adopted at the Feira European Council in June 2000, with the request that the Commission take a leading role in its implementation.
In April 2001, a second foreign ministers’ conference on the ND took place. It was organised under the Swedish presidency and held in Luxembourg. Later that year a full report prepared by the presidency was presented to the Gothenburg European Council.[i]The Action Plan provides both the blueprint for implementation and the backdrop against which successes and failures can be analysed. The first part of the plan recalls the major soft-security challenges of the region and addresses the horizontal questions of institutional and financial frameworks for activities relating to the Northern Dimension. The second part sets out the operational objectives and perspectives for actions between 2000 and 2003. As its underlying rationale, it is stated that ‘the European Union and its partner countries believe that the Northern Dimension will contribute to reinforcing positive interdependence between them thereby enhancing security, stability, democratic reforms and sustainable development in the region’.[ii]The priority sectors listed in the Action Plan are for the most part those of the 1999 Council guidelines. An impressive array of issues are mentioned, as if quantity were to substitute or disguise the scant possibilities for real action.
Under the heading of infrastructure, which is conceptualised as a soft-security issue by merit of being a precondition for enhanced regional cooperation and people-to-people contacts, one finds subsumed the issues of energy, transport, telecommunication and information technology. Climate change, forests, and sustainable development are mentioned under the rubric of environment pollution. The section on nuclear safety cites the issue of spent fuel in northwest Russia and the nuclear power plants of Kola, Leningrad oblast and Ignalina (Lithuania). Public health issues are seen as comprising all kinds of communicable diseases. Also included in the plan are trade and business cooperation and human resources development and research. The justice and home affairs section deals mainly with the problem of organised crime, while the part on regional and cross-border cooperation focuses on aspects of improved border management. Finally attention is drawn to the particularly difficult situation of Kaliningrad.[iii]
Obstacles to an efficient coordination between the EU's programme in the region
Three main obstacles prevent interoperability of the EU’s programmes. First, implementing transnational projects in Tacis and Phare requires applications for funds from each separate national fund within these programmes. Thus, the Via Baltica project was accepted by the Estonian Phare cross-border cooperation programme while being rejected by the Latvian one. In regard to this situation, the Regional Policy Committee of the European Parliament called in 1999 for the creation of a single fund for all cross-border cooperation involving the three programmes as part of its report on the Northern Dimension.[iv]Alternatively, such problems could be solved by permitting applicants to apply for, and link together, project funding from the three different EU financing instruments – Tacis, Phare and Interreg (so-called cross-funding) regardless of whether it is a joint project between an EU member state, which can apply for Interreg funding, and a candidate country (like Poland which at present can apply for Phare funding) or an EU member and a non-candidate country (like Russia, which at present can apply for Tacis funding).
A second problem is that the Phare and Interreg programmes have different administrative structures. Phare relies on national agencies and thus entails much longer processing periods for proposed projects while Interreg has a secretariat in Brussels, which selects the individual projects.[v]This difficulty has been partly overcome by the introduction of ‘Joint Programming Documents’, which should also ensure a smooth transition from Phare cross-border cooperation to Interreg programmes after enlargement, since these programmes are exclusively within the EU.
The third and most important difficulty has been the varying programming periods. Whereas Interreg finances projects for up to three years, Tacis and Phare are limited to annual projects and budget allocations. This planning incompatibility has not been alleviated through the new Commission guidelines on cross-border cooperation of Interreg and Tacis. The double application process will continue to be necessary,[vi]and project applicants are in charge of the actual coordination.[vii]The fact that the Northern Dimension is even mentioned in the new Tacis regulations, in the context of introducing the vague possibility of multi-annual Tacis and Phare projects, is evidence that the talk of enhanced cooperation is leading to action.
To sum up, the Commission was made aware of these three problem areas (multiple applications, different administrative structures and planning incompatibilities), and has now made those who apply for project funds aware of them. Applicants are now asked to point out aspects of their proposed projects that are of relevance to other EU programmes and to put in double or triple applications, thus closing the self-referential circle.
These are some of the problems in realising the Northern Dimension’s first policy goal of creating added value through internal coordination of the Union’s programmes on soft-security issues in the region. Efforts are being made to address these problems, though it is unlikely that the Union will succeed in merging the three types of programmes on cross-border cooperation in all the border areas of the region.
Sub-regional Partners
On the level between the EU and its partner countries are a multitude of sub-regional organisations and institutions active in the Northern Dimension area. It has been argued that this overabundance has led to an excess of spontaneous institutional activity without clear overall guidelines, making coordination difficult. Originally, the Finnish initiative envisioned the Commission taking up an active leadership position in the CBSS (Council of Baltic Sea States) and in the BEAC (Barents Euro-Arctic Council) and eventually joining the Arctic Council. The three most important regional councils were to generate ideas for the Northern Dimension and help implement its policy. These hopes have not materialised, partly because the external relations and enlargement directorate-generals (DGs) of the EU tend to keep tight control over their policies and stress the strong bilateral component and the importance of national administrations in the partner countries for implementation. Once again a picture emerges of DG Regional Policy being far more open to flexible regional approaches to spatial planning (that is, balanced and sustainable development across the European space), while the other two DGs focus on sectoral projects in a national setting.
One recent example of cooperation between the EU and CBSS is the Northern e-Dimension, initiated by CBSS and prepared in close cooperation with the Commission’s DG Information Society over the course of nine months in 2001. It is part of the soft-security goal to enhance regional cooperation by facilitating new business opportunities through closing the gap in information technology infrastructure. This would also serve to reduce the social divide.
The Northern e-Dimension Action Plan was adopted at a ministerial meeting in Riga on 28 September 2001. A kick-off meeting was held in Tampere on 6 November 2001. For the northwest Russia component of the e-Dimension the Commission now proposes an indicative budget of €12m euros.[viii] Developments under the Swedish EU presidency in 2001 are promising. The overall aim was to establish the Northern Dimension as a permanent EU policy and integrate it in the daily activities of the Union. Due to the strong personal interest Commissioner Chris Patten developed in the Northern Dimension, and particular in the Kaliningrad question, the extremely limited personnel capacity of the Commission section dealing with the Northern Dimension was reinforced. An ‘ND Focal Point’ (that is, a network of contact points between participating countries, institutions and organisations) and an Internet web site were established.[ix]Most important was the foreign ministers’ conference on the ND in April 2001, where the CBSS, the BEAC and the Arctic Council delivered project proposals. The USA and Canada took part as observers.
Outside the Northern Dimension programme are parallel efforts to develop tourism and manage the environmental and economic sustainability of coastal zones, to plan for development that cuts across national boundaries, to create institutional and infrastructure links of strategic importance between major urban centres, to develop a pan-Baltic integrated transport structure (ports, ferry terminals, roads) and to develop transnational institutions. All of these aims come under the remit of the EU’s Interreg III programme in support for the Baltic Sea Region, which was approved by the Commission in October 2001. In the period 2000–06, an overall €97m will be paid out of the Community budget for the aforementioned purposes.[x]This is expected to attract an additional €120m through national programmes and international financial institutions.[xi]
From 1994 to 2000, the Phare programme spent roughly €55m on environmental projects in the Baltic Region. Under ISPA (Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession), a programme for infrastructure modernisation in EU candidate countries, a further €500m will be spent annually on the environment for all EU applicants. The Baltic States and Poland will receive a large share of it, though how much is not yet clear. Tacis funds for the environment in northwest Russia were quite modest, amounting to €24m between 1996 and 1999.[xii]Nevertheless, these funds made a significant contribution to the clean-up of the Krazny Bor hazardous waste disposal site near St Petersburg, the clean-up of the Tuloma River and improving the water quality in Karelia. They were also used to develop strategies for natural parks. The Tacis nuclear safety programme commanded most resources: €317m was spent between 1991 and 1999 on technical and financial assistance in this area. On border crossings, the Tacis programme spent €50m in northwest Russia and Kaliningrad in the period 1996–99.[xiii]The Tacis total budget for cross-border projects on Russian territory in the year 2002–03 is €90m, of which €38m has already been spent. An additional €11m will be spent in Kaliningrad on border crossings to create the physical infrastructure – customs posts and passport control with appropriate information systems shared with Lithuania and Poland.[xiv]Also in Kaliningrad, some €33m have been spent on health, education and the energy sector.
Within the general context of pre-EU accession aid encompassing Phare, Sapard (aid for agricultural and rural development) and ISPA, the three Baltic states have been allocated an overall amount of around €550m for the years 2000–02. Between 1992 and 1999, they received some €770m through Phare alone; however, there has been significant differences in the amounts received by each of the three Baltic republics. Lithuania has received about double the amount given to Estonia, and one third more than that given to Latvia.[xv]This gives an indication of the Union’s financial involvement in the region. By comparison, its activities in northwest Russia are dwarfed.
Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership (NDEP)
The NDEP is the newcomer to the EU’s northern soft-security policy. At the ministerial conference on the Northern Dimension in April 2001, it was supported and seen ‘as a good way to mobilise and combine financial resources and realise synergies when conditions are appropriate for investment’.[xvi]The NDEP was endorsed at the EU summit in June that year. Its role is to address environmental hot spots and energy efficiency in the Northern Dimension Area. Initially it will focus exclusively on northwest Russia. Considering the figures on financial support under Tacis above (less than Egypt receives in aid from the EU) this is a development in the right direction, given the significant cross-border impact of environmental problems in this region. For example, sewage from the St Petersburg area (population 1.5 million) and from Kaliningrad (population one million) is discharged untreated into the Baltic Sea. The Barents Sea situation is even worse, given the many decommissioned nuclear submarines stored there.
The concept and approach for NDEP was prepared jointly by the EBRD, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, on an initiative originally taken by the Nordic Investment Bank. The fund for NDEP projects will receive about €50m from Tacis and another €50m from the EBRD and the Northern Investment Bank (NIB). Member states, especially riverine states of the Baltic Sea, are also expected to donate substantial sums at a donors’ conference in 2002. The EBRD intends to increase its allotments for Russia by 50% over the next 3–5 years.
The most important achievement of the NDEP is the mandate by the Stockholm European Council for the European Investment Bank (EIB), an EU financial institution, to make €100m available for projects with direct environmental impact in Russia. This is truly a new move for the EIB, especially considering the securities given by the EU for EIB lending in Russia. A Council decision on this was adopted on 6 November 2001, ‘granting a Community guarantee to the European Investment Bank against losses under a special lending action for selected environmental projects in the Baltic Sea basin of Russia under the Northern Dimension’.[xvii]
The mix of grants, loans and user charges will certainly help to overcome institutional weaknesses, which have become evident in particular in sole grants projects on the Russian side of implementation. It might also constitute a model for interlocking institutions with IFIs, the EU, member countries and recipient countries all paying into the same fund and committing themselves to the successful follow-through on proposed projects.
Overall, the basic dilemma remains that as the Baltic States catch up with the EU, the greater the economic divide between them and northwest Russia will grow. The more the EU insists on the full and inflexible application of the Schengen acquis by all candidate countries in the region, the less cross-border contact there will be between EU citizens and their neighbours in Russia. Sealing off an enlarged EU from its neighbours with weak political and judicial systems will not help the development of those neighbours, who would otherwise benefit from increased contact.
The existence of so many actors, partners, programmes and topics on a policy agenda may at times, prove to be inefficient. Nevertheless, such variety may also serve as a useful fermenting forum. When a certain issue becomes urgent, the onus to act will most likely fall first into the remit of the institution with the broadest policy approach, such as the Northern Dimension. However, national suspicions and administrative inertia have often slowed down or put a brake on cooperation and integration between Russia and the EU. The Danish presidency of the EU in the second half of 2002 will have to make sure that the Northern Dimension’s momentum is not lost.
[i]Documents can be found at: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/north_dim/index.htm
[ii]Action Plan, heading 7, p. 4. [iii]For a detailed analysis of the Union’s policy towards Kaliningrad see: Heinz Timmermann “Kaliningrad: Eine Pilotregion für die Gestaltung der Partnerschaft EU-Rußlan?” In Osteuropa 9/2001, pp. 1037-166. See also: James Baxendale “EU-Russia Relations: Is 2001 a Turning Point for Kaliningrad?” In European Foreign Affairs Review 6, 2001, pp. 437-464. [iv]European Parliament (1999) Report on the Communication of the Commission - A Northern Dimension for the policies of the Union. PE 230.181/fin. In April 2000 Parliament, in its opinion on the INTERREG III guidelines, has called on the Commission “to co-ordinate better with INTERREG the various instruments used for co-operation projects in third countries” and stressed “that this co-ordination of instruments is a sine qua non for genuine co-operation.” [v]Baltic Sea Region INTERREG III (2000) Community Initiative Programme 2000-2006, pp. 44-46. http://www.spatial.balitic.net/iiib.html. [vi]European Commission (2001) A Guide to bringing INTERREG and TACIS funding together, Brussels, p. 5. [viii]European Commission (2001) TACIS Regional Cooperation: Strategic Considerations 2002-2006 and Indicative Programme 2002-2003, Brussels, p. 21 and Annex A p. 25. [ix]This web-page can be found under: http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/north_dim/index.htm
[x]Uniting Europe, No. 162, 24 October 2001, p. 9. [xi]Bulletin Quotidien Europe, 17 October 2001. [xii]See: http://www.eur.ru/eng/TACIS [xiii]TACIS CBC indicative programme 2000-2003, p.2. [xv]These numbers are calculated from the Commission’s “Regular Reports on Latvia’s Progress towards Accession”, “Regular Reports on Estonia’s Progress towards Accession”, and “Regular Reports on Lithuania’s Progress towards Accession”, released on 13 November 2001, Brussels, p. 9 for all reports. [xvi]Council document 9546/01, p. 2. [xvii]Published in the Official Journal of the European Communities 9.11.2001, L 292/41, Doc. No. 2001/777/EC. 
