Chapter 2
Challenges to stability in the Asia-Pacific
Plenary session no 1
Saturday 31 May 2008, 9.00 am
SPEAKER
Dr Robert M. Gates
Secretary of Defense, United States
The opening plenary session featured an address by Dr Robert M. Gates, the US Secretary of Defense. Gates began by saying that the Shangri-La Dialogue ‘clearly has no peer in Asia. We all make time to come here because the Dialogue offers an unbeatable mix: cutting-edge topics, world-renowned experts and senior security officials working together for three days.’ Asia, he said, had become the centre of gravity in a rapidly globalising world. Hundreds of millions of people had risen from poverty, many of them into relative affluence, as a result of cooperation, openness and mutual security. It was understandable that Asia was eager to redefine its security relationships with the rest of the world. He would make three points on these relationships:
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the United States was a Pacific nation with an enduring role in Asia. Its presence had been an essential element enabling Asia’s rise;
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the United States stood for openness and against exclusivity; and
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any future administration’s Asia security policy would retain strong and enduring interests in the region
Enlarging on the first of these points, Gates said the security of all Asian countries, large or small, was enhanced by a strong US presence. America played many roles: as an ally, partner and friend; as a routine offshore presence; as a resident power; and as an agent of professionalism and capacity in service to a range of non-military needs, such as disaster response. The primary anchors were alliances with Japan, South Korea and Australia. The US also had formal treaties, including with the Philippines and Thailand. There was a web of relationships, including growing ties with India and increasing engagement with China. By the term ‘resident power’ Gates said he was referring to the sovereign American territory in the western Pacific from the Aleutian Islands to Guam.
He noted a trend towards discussions in Asia about a new security architecture. The US would participate in development of forums to deal with region-specific problems. Meanwhile, ‘we will continue to depend on our time-tested Asian alliance architecture, a framework embracing many overlapping security relationships and still evolving after the end of the Cold War. Our security activities include training, military professionalism education, transit arrangements, joint exercises, and also the sharing of strategic perceptions.’
It was during the annual multilateral exercise Cobra Gold that the US military had diverted ships and aircraft to help provide relief to victims of Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar. However, they had not been allowed to do so. Myanmar’s refusal had been, he said, ‘at a cost of tens of thousands of lives’. Efforts were still being made to provide aid to victims. The US welcomed the leadership of ASEAN and looked forward to the quick emergence of a mechanism to smooth the provision of international assistance to disaster victims.
The US military had security exchanges with most Asian governments, ranging from modest to substantial. It was helping to build the capacities of partner nations so that they were better able to defend themselves. Thus, America’s Asian relationships were stronger and were evolving to reflect changing times. ‘Far from frozen in a Cold War paradigm, our presence in Asia is designed to meet our mutual challenges in the twenty-first century,’ Gates said.
Turning to his second point, Gates argued that Asia’s prosperity rested on respect for international norms, on open trade and ideas, and on a shared responsibility to protect common resources – whether in the maritime, space or cyber domains – even while pursuing individual agendas. Without such an approach, tensions could rise quickly when sovereign states competed for resources. An example was a code of conduct among states with competing claims in the South China Sea; the US had urged ‘a calm and non-assertive environment in which contending claims may be discussed and, if possible, resolved’.
It was in this spirit that the United States sought more openness in military modernisation in Asia. ‘Transparency enhances confidence and reduces competitive arms spending’, Gates said. He cited the open manner in which the US had recently used a missile to shoot down a defunct and possibly dangerous satellite. Lack of clarity about a neighbour’s intentions tended to prompt counter-strategies and suspicion. Therefore, ‘we desire to work with every country in Asia to deepen our understanding of their military and defence finances, and to do so on a reciprocal basis.’
On his third point regarding the likely approach to Asia of the next US administration, Gates said it was preposterous to suggest that the United States would lose the close interest in Asia that it had maintained since the nineteenth century. The next administration seemed certain to continue existing security partnerships, and would also inherit an agenda of worrying issues, including North Korea.
In conclusion, Gates said the United States had noted the stirrings of a new regionalism and a search for new frameworks to moderate inter-state competition. While this was welcome and natural, ‘we do have some benchmarks’. First, this quest should not be viewed as a zero-sum game. It should not exclude any single country: there was little room, he said, for a separate East Asian order. Secondly, there should be a willingness to develop security arrangements suited to common needs. ‘We will work to ensure that the United States continues to be welcomed in coming years in this part of the world, as we have been in the past.’
Questions and answers
Professor Simon Chesterman, Director of the Singapore Programme, New York University School of Law, asked Gates what he thought would be the security legacy of the Bush administration in the Asia-Pacific region. Gatesbelieved it would be a strong and positive one. After being outside government for 15 years, he found the two most dramatic developments in the world to be the significant improvement in the US–Japanese relationship, especially in the area of security, and the advances in the US–Indian relationship. The administration had fostered collaboration with partners in Asia that built on a strong foundation. ‘Regardless of the controversies that attend Iraq and other policies, here in Asia the overall legacy is a pretty straightforward and very positive one.’
Daniel R. Fung, Chairman, Des Voeux Chambers, Hong Kong, asked whether there was any truth to the long-standing rumour that the aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk would be sold to India. Gates was aware of no such plans.
Pierre Lellouche, a member of the French National Assembly, did not understand the future American role in Asia that Gates had sought to define. He had mentioned old elements, such as strategic access, freedom of navigation and freedom from domination of outside powers, and had also spoken of a role as dialogue-provider or referee. ‘But what exactly is the strategy? Are you going to be a protector, a guarantor or an architect of the system?’ Lellouche noted a US preoccupation with not being excluded from the future architecture. Secondly, how did Gates view the allocation of American defence assets between Europe, the Gulf and Asia? Gatessaw the United States as a partner and collaborator, playing many roles. It would be a protector if required, in the context of its security alliances. It would bring humanitarian assistance, and would assist in training and equipping. Regarding its military assets, the US would maintain a strong presence in Europe, the Middle East and Asia. He believed there was broad bipartisan support in Congress to sustain the required capabilities.
Barry Desker, Dean of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, asked whether US policy on North Korea was aligned with that of the new administration in South Korea. Gates said it was. ‘We are both committed to the Six-Party Talks, and in the continuing effort to try to get North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons capability.’
Mikhail Margelov, Chairman of the Committee for International Relations of Russia’s Federation Council, asked what he called a ‘philosophical’ question. Was US foreign policy based on ideology or on pragmatism? Gates replied that he had recently given a speech entitled ‘A realist looks at idealism in American foreign policy’. From the beginning of the republic, he said, there had been a blend of hard-edged realism coupled with a desire to stand for freedom. ‘We have tilted to one direction or another at various times in our history. The two extremes, if you will, historically were John Quincy Adams, who basically said we wish everyone well, but you are on your own, to Woodrow Wilson, who vowed to make the world safe for democracy.’ Gates continued: ‘From the standpoint of hard realism it was our first president, George Washington, who basically, if I may use a contemporary figure of speech, was willing to throw the French revolution under the bus, in order to avoid a war with Britain, and then proceeded to sign a treaty with Britain, and he was accused of selling out the principles of 1776.’ However, the US had often supported those seeking freedom, including in Eastern Europe and Asia. ‘I would say that you will see differences of emphasis from one president to another, but throughout most of our history, presidents have combined both their commitment to the propagation of freedom, liberty and the protection of human rights, as well as hard-edged realism in terms of protecting our interests.’
Rear Admiral Pradeep Chauhan, Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff, India, welcomed Gates’s commitment to inclusiveness. However, this meant dealing with large numbers. One recently launched initiative, the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, involved 30 countries, and these were merely the littoral states. What kind of construct would be inclusive enough to include all countries of the Asia-Pacific? Gates said numbers did not preclude progress. In Afghanistan, 40 countries were participating in the NATO operation, including countries that were not NATO members. ‘The fact that a number of nations are involved is not an obstacle to making progress or getting things done. It just requires a little ingenuity.’
Koutaro Tamura,a member of Japan’s House of Councillors, was concerned that the US would lose interest in Asia because of domestic economic problems, or that it would pay more attention to the Middle East, South America and Russia. Gates said the US ought to be able to do several things at once. The US had economic, security and political interests in all regions. ‘The US has the resources, has the intellectual capital and has the governmental organisations to be able to deal with all of these parts of the world at the same time.’ Nor would it lose interest in Asia, because it was itself an Asian power. ‘We have been here a long time and we will continue to be here ... Nobody should have any worries on that score.’
Joseph Lieberman,US Senator, agreed with Gates about the ‘breadth, depth, longevity and bipartisanship’ of America’s commitment to the Asia-Pacific region. ‘We are committed here as far forward as the eye can see by the geographic reality that we are a Pacific power and by the economic and even ideological realities that continue to draw us here.’ However, Lieberman was concerned about growing economic protectionism in the US.
Professor François Heisbourg, Chairman of the IISS Council, asked about the proposed US–Indian nuclear agreement. Would it be best to have it ratified by Congress before the end of the Bush administration, and what would Gates recommend to the next administration regarding the agreement? Gatessaid the US and Indian governments were both committed to it, though it faced domestic challenges in India. ‘I believe it has been the position of the US to be patient as the Indians work through this issue.’ Lieberman believed there was broad – though not universal – bipartisan support, but the sense of Congress was to wait until there was enough support within India for the agreement.
Professor Tommy Koh, Chairman of the Institute of Policy Studies, Singapore, asked Gates to explain the apparent contradiction between US policy towards North Korea, based upon engagement and dialogue, and towards Myanmar, based upon the failed approach of isolation and sanctions. Gates said that to have a productive dialogue, it was necessary for both sides to engage. The North Koreans had come to the table as part of the Six-Party Talks, but Myanmar had shown little interest in engaging with the US. Many governments had tried to persuade Myanmar to accept aid following the cyclone, but had zero influence. ‘We have reached out on a number of occasions – 15 different times – to the leadership of Myanmar, to get them to open up. It has not been us who have been deaf and dumb in response to the pleas of the international community, but the government in Myanmar.’
Following up this subject, Ralph Cossa, President of the Pacific Forum of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, asked about the possibility offorced entry or forced assistance in Myanmar. Gates said the US did not support forced assistance and would respect the sovereignty of Myanmar.
Dr Kurt M. Campbell, Chief Executive, Center for a New American Security, asked about the role of defence establishments in anticipating the challenges that would be posed by climate change. Gates said intelligence and defence could play a constructive supporting role. The US military was one of the largest single users of petroleum products in the world and had been looking at alternative fuels, as well as at ways to recapture used petroleum products. Each $1 per-barrel rise in the oil price cost the Pentagon about $130 million.
Manish Tewari, spokesperson for the All India Congress Committee, asked what the policy of the next administration was likely to be towards Iraq and Afghanistan. Gates believed the next president would increase the level of US commitment to Afghanistan. Although Iraq was a controversial subject in the US, there was broad admission that there had been significant progress over the past year. He hoped the situation would continue to improve and that there could be further reductions of troop numbers in the autumn. ‘The issue is really, in my opinion, a question of pacing and how fast we do it and how fast the Iraqis can take on responsibilities.’ He hoped that ‘we continue to get the end game right and that we do not let our impatience cause us to make a tactical decision that has strategic consequences’.
Michael Yahuda, Professor Emeritus in International Relations at the London School of Economics, commented that the relationship between China and Japan was regarded in the region as crucial to strategic stability, and there was concern about distrust and rivalry between them, despite the recent improvement in their relations.He said that earlier this year, a Chinese vice foreign minister had proposed to a senior American official that Washington, Tokyo and Beijing should have meetings so as to increase mutual trust and contribute to a greater sense of strategic stability. However, Washington had apparently not seemed interested. Gates said the US had a long-standing deep security relationship and alliance with Japan, and had to give priority to that. It also had every interest in improved relations between China and Japan, and could contribute to this in ways that were consistent with its obligations to Japan.
Dr Jia Qingguo, Professor at the School of International Studies, Peking University, asked whether a potential new regional security architecture would be a hierarchy in which the US would classify members as allies or non-allies, or an equal regional structure with equal membership. What would be the role of values? Gates said new ideas had been coming from the region, and his purpose had been to ‘lay down a marker about how we view the emergence of such an architecture’. ‘I think it is more up to those who have been articulating the value or the need for such an architecture to describe what it would look like.’ He did not think of it as necessarily being hierarchical. The closest alliances were between societies and governments that shared values, but this did not preclude improving relationships with countries that had different values or interests. The key was inclusiveness.
Oksana Antonenko, IISS Senior Fellow for Russia and Eurasia, asked about Central Asia, a region that was increasingly important from the point of view of Asian security and was also a test case for the rise of China. The legacy of the Cold War had not been overcome, and a zero-sum approach to security prevailed. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation had been set up, but no comprehensive security framework was in place. What would the US do to promote regional cooperation and how could Central Asia be included in the wider Asian security architecture? Gates saida number of Central Asian countries had a great deal of resources and ‘could be constructive players on the international scene’. Others did not have resources and faced serious challenges. The key was to encourage countries to be willing to establish relationships with Europe and Asia, as they were with Russia.
