Questions and Answers
Dr John Chipman
Deputy Prime Minister, thank you very much in particular for introducing a pragmatic element into the discussions about defence diplomacy, talking about how areas such as the European Union and Japan have helped the kingdom of Cambodia to engage in small arms control and thereby served national development. I think everybody should note a very practical recommendation that you made at the end that could lead to more pragmatic defence diplomacy by calling for more regional, technical cooperation on state storage of small arms. I am again delighted that we have a policy suggestion here that perhaps officials could discuss between themselves in the future.
We have had extraordinarily rich presentations about the Vietnamese perspective, the Australian Defence White Paper and now a very practical proposal. I would encourage comments and points of view on these presentations.
Dr Chicako Kawakatsu Ueki, Professor, Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University, Japan; IISS Member
Mr Fitzgibbon, how do you see the connecting of hubs in relation to other measures that you implement such as defence diplomacy with other countries such as China and secondly do you see the connection of hubs as the basis for greater regional architecture in the future.
Luvsanvandan Bold, Minister of Defence, Mongolia
I believe this discussion of defence diplomacy is a very organic continuation of this morning’s discussion, where we talked about improving transparency, which would not only mean disclosing national military secrets, but would also include confidence‑building measures in the region. I think the most important part of confidence building would be this military diplomacy and I wanted to emphasise an important point in that regard. There are successful and less successful countries. If you look at successful countries such as Singapore, they have created an effective legal environment. If you have a consistent legal environment, it is more likely that the country and its people will prosper. Military diplomacy should also work on consistency as a basis for improving transparency and building confidence in every region. You cannot succeed without a consistent framework of rules. Inconsistency has been the cause of really big disasters worldwide. Our region needs to commit itself to developing acceptable and reasonable laws through defence diplomacy.
Dr Jonathan Pollack, Professor, Asian and Pacific Studies, Naval War College, USA; IISS Member
Minister Fitzgibbon, I have read the Australian Defence White Paper with great interest and it seems to me in many respects to be a model of strategic clarity and reasoning that warrants the attention of everyone; however the White Paper has been subject to some question. Admittedly matching capabilities to prospective threats over a 20 year plus time horizon is a very imperfect science at best, but I would appreciate some clarification about how the Department of Defence in Australia seeks to reconcile or explain the relationship between prospective threats in your region and some of the longer‑term acquisitions that Australia proposes, specifically the new submarine capabilities, air assets and perhaps most controversially Cruise missile capabilities. I am not questioning Australia’s need to defend its own security interests, but it does seem to me that there is some lack of specificity in some aspects, even though the document as a whole is unusually explicit and clear in its reasoning, even more so following your comments today about things such as collaboration with Indonesia. Could you explain how these overall policies interrelate with one another in the context of what is certainly a very ambitious modernisation strategy over the longer term?
Participant
Mr Fitzgibbon, the recently released White Paper is enormously important and from an academic point of view I think I understand why Australia is nervous about the rapid rise of China, however, there is a danger that if the response is too aggressive it might become a self‑fulfilling prophecy. What needs to be done to prevent this happening?
Professor Rommel Banlaoi, Executive Director, Philippine Institute for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, Philippines; IISS Member
General Phung Quang Thanh, since the signing of The Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea in 2002, we thought disputes in the area had calmed down, but recently it has been flaring up again because of overlapping maritime claims that have been submitted. I visited the area last week and was impressed by what Vietnam, China and Malaysia are doing in their islands. I think this will have a big impact on defence diplomacy in South East Asia, particularly the claims submitted in the South China Sea. What does Vietnam propose to do to reduce the tension that is once again breaking out in the South China Sea?
Dr Fu-kuo Liu, Research Fellow and Chairman, The First Research Division, Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University
I would like to ask the Minister of Defence for Vietnam how he proposes to use defence diplomacy to ensure the security of the region is guaranteed. Since Taiwan is not part of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, how exactly do you think that defence diplomacy can ensure that everybody will be satisfied?
Barry Wain, Writer-in-Residence, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Australia
In your remarks General Phung you reiterated Vietnam’s commitment to the peaceful settlement of territorial disputes. There has been a recent report from Russia that Vietnam intends to purchase six Kilo class submarines and double the number of Sukhoi jets it is buying from Russia. These developments would change the security dynamics of the region considerably. In the spirit of transparency can you tell us whether Vietnam intends to acquire submarines?
General Phung Quang Thanh
Translation from Vietnamese: [First of all I would like to thank you for your questions. This is also an opportunity for us to expand on the matters of your interest. The territorial dispute on the South China Sea is decreasing and, to answer your question as to why there is the need to build these constructions, we are currently not establishing new military posts. These are the existing military posts which were sparsely equipped in the past and as such they do not provide the military units and inhabitants living in the islands with a stable living condition to withstand the heat and the storms on the South China Sea. As such when the economy improves our government has directed that we need to upgrade them in order to care for the lives of our soldiers and people on the islands.
Regarding the initiatives; we propose that those countries that declare their sovereignty over SpratlyIslands on the South China Sea should restrict themselves from further conflict and should not establish new military posts. They should not threaten the use of force nor use force to prevent activities in this area. The area is in dispute between many countries therefore we need to peacefully negotiate with each other to settle it in the spirit of the international laws and the UNCLOS of 1982.
For the question regarding Taiwan as to why it is not in the Code of Conduct we consider that Taiwan is a part of China’s territory and China has already signed the Code of Conduct on the South China Sea.
With regard to the establishment of the Code of Conduct; Vietnam is putting in efforts together with other concerned countries to build the Code of Conduct on the South China Sea.
With regard to the matter of your interest which is the information regarding Vietnam buying submarines and flight fighters from Russia; this information is not completely correct. We are currently in the process of research and investigation. We are studying and considering options so that when our economy improves, we will modernise our armed force to increase its defence capability in order to protect our country. We absolutely will not attack any neighbouring countries. We think that a good investment for defence when our economy improves, an army with high capability and high readiness, a bilateral and multilateral co-operation with the neighbouring countries and the countries in the region and a increased friendship and trust within international friends, is exactly a condition for all of us to prevent conflicts and wars in order to protect peace, stability and co-operation for mutual development in the region and the world at large. Thank you.]
Minister Fitzgibbon
The 2009 White Paper is the product of 14 months of careful, thorough and thoughtful examination of Australia’s strategic outlook. I think you need to keep some things in perspective. Yes, we have big plans for our force over the next two decades, but our expenditure on defence will remain constant over that period at about 2% of GDP (Gross Domestic Product). It will creep just above that this fiscal year, but that is largely due to the contraction of GDP that we are all experiencing.
It would not, of course, be a White Paper without some contentious issues in it and you rightly made the point that this is not an exact science; it is challenging to look out over such a long period and to try to respond appropriately in terms of both force structure and capabilities. We make no apologies for the fact that we are building a force that allows us to maintain the capability to defend our continent and that is our number one priority as a nation state. For us this means being able to protect the air/sea gap to our north, on the sea, under the sea and in the air. That is why you have seen such a focus on maritime capabilities. I would describe it as a progression of what we are already doing.
On the question of Cruise missiles, Australia has had a strategic strike capability for about 30 years; it was called the F‑111. This is a capability that we will retire at the end of 2010. This is just a natural progression to the next level of technology.
Importantly we have produced a balanced force, which means that we not only have the ability to protect our continent with the sixth largest coastline in the world, so the investment in maritime capabilities should not come as a surprise, but also it is about the capability to play a lead role in stabilisation efforts in places such as the South West Pacific, which we do on a regular basis with our partners from New Zealand and other places such as East Timor. Again, we will maintain an ability to play a role in more distant places such as Afghanistan, where we believe we can make a contribution. We will end up spending $43 billion more on capability over the next 10 years than we would have, if we had stayed on the trajectory inherited from the former government, but 3% real growth and 2% of Australia’s GDP is rather modest, when you look across the region and acknowledge and recognise some of the money being spent elsewhere.
Dr John Chipman
Let me simultaneously draw to a conclusion this plenary session and the 2009 Shangri‑La Dialogue. I would like first to thank the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence of Cambodia for his full participation and attendance. We welcome all 10 ASEAN states to the Shangri‑La Dialogue and we are delighted by your presence here. Could I also thank the Minister of Defence of Vietnam; we hope this will be the first of many appearances and for your full participation we thank you very warmly. Could I also thank Joel Fitzgibbon, not only for his address and his second year of participation, but also, through him, thank the Prime Minister of Australia again for having taken the time out of an extraordinarily busy and active schedule to come here on Friday night and open the Shangri‑La Dialogue. I think that in itself was a very significant event for us all.
I think the 2009 Shangri‑La Dialogue has been a really first‑class affair. Let me say two brief things. First, real defence diplomacy of immediate, strategic consequence has taken place here. Second, key policy ideas have been launched and I think they will be debated in the weeks, months and year to come. The twin objectives of the Shangri‑La Dialogue, conflict management and defence diplomacy, were therefore served this year.
I want to thank the government of Singapore again and specifically the Ministry of Defence, but also all the other agencies of the government of Singapore that have collaborated so effectively in making our time here both so productive and so pleasant. I would also like to thank the various commercial and philanthropic sponsors that have allowed us to be here. I would like also to thank the members of the ISS conference team, who took care of 357 delegates over three days, having issued, I think, 4,200 security passes to make certain all went well here. Let me thank you all and announce the provisional dates for 2010 Shangri‑La Dialogue are 4‑6 June 2010. Thank you and congratulations to you all.
