Introduction to Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia
Mark Fitzpatrick, editor
Singapore International Energy Week, 18 November 2009
Southeast Asia is on the cusp of joining the nuclear renaissance. Three countries in this region (Vietnam, Indonesia and Thailand) have announced plans for nuclear power, two others (the Philippines and Malaysia)are deciding on the option and two more (Singapore and Cambodia) recently expressed an interest in this form of energy for the first time. That is seven out of the ten ASEAN members.
Meanwhile, the national debate in Australia about adding value to its uranium exports by enriching the product, while recently decided in the negative, may not be over. Myanmar plans to build a small research reactor, seven of which are already operating in the countries covered by our dossier. However, rumours about clandestine nuclear cooperation with North Korea and Myanmar’s unclear intentions give rise to proliferation worries. Elsewhere in the region, the major concerns about the introduction of nuclear power pertain to safety and environmental considerations, and whether facilities and materials will be secure. A nuclear accident or incident of nuclear terrorism would also have a severe economic impact.
Interest in nuclear energy is not new to the region. Indonesia has been studying the idea since the late 1970s, and the Philippines actually built a nuclear power plant in 1984, but never operated it due to political and safety considerations. Despite such previous research, nuclear power has only recently taken on a sense of inevitability in the region. Not all of the plans for nuclear energy in Southeast Asia will be implemented as envisioned, however.
The rationale for nuclear power in Southeast Asia is largely the same as elsewhere: as a way to help meet rising electricity demands in rapidly developing economies, and to ensure energy security, energy autonomy and diversification of supply. Even in countries blessed with oil and gas deposits, governments are acutely aware that these are finite and depleting resources, and many are reluctant to be dependent on potentially unreliable external suppliers.
Notwithstanding these peaceful purposes, the surge of interest in nuclear energy gives rise to some uneasiness about how nuclear power in the region might be misused. Concerns about nuclear diversion for non-peaceful purposes are less pronounced than in many other regions, such as the Middle East, which we assessed last year in our strategic dossier on Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East: in the Shadow of Iran. With the arguable exceptions of Myanmar and possibly Vietnam, obvious proliferation drivers are absent in Southeast Asia. In sharp contrast to large nations to the north and west, the countries of this region do not view nuclear weapons as useful for either national security or national status. The states in the region have embraced non-proliferation norms and declared Southeast Asia a nuclear-weapons-free zone by means of the Treaty of Bangkok.
The interest that both Australia and Indonesia once showed in acquiring nuclear weapons is a distant memory, long replaced by an opposite inclination towards global nuclear disarmament. Yet states in the region could do more to improve their non-proliferation bone fides, including by ratifying the safeguards Additional Protocol, which is in force for only two ASEAN states, Indonesia and Singapore.
Commentators with an incomplete understanding of what it takes to build nuclear weapons often assume that the acquisition of nuclear energy could be an easy stepping stone to nuclear weapons. There are ways that nuclear power programmes can contribute to weapons development, but nuclear power technology alone cannot be put to nuclear weapons use without either uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing. None of the ASEAN countries or those in Australasia has any plans to introduce these sensitive technologies.
Concerns have been raised about the safety of nuclear power in a region that is prone to seismic disasters and bureaucratic corruption, and that has experienced home-grown terrorist activity and, in some places, an insufficient safety culture. In addition to energy security, the threat of nuclear accidents, nuclear theft and nuclear terrorism should be key security considerations when nuclear power plants are introduced. The controversial environmental and political risks posed by nuclear waste must also be taken into account. States in Southeast Asia that introduce nuclear power will need eventually to find a solution for the safe disposal of spent fuel.
Concerns about nuclear technology touch upon Southeast Asia in yet another way, highlighted by the participation earlier this decade by a Malaysian-based firm in a black-market enterprise to produce centrifuge parts for Libya’s nuclear weapons programme.
The need for nuclear energy to be harnessed in a manner that is safe, secure and non-threatening and for nations to prohibit illicit weapons-related trade provides the motivation for this report.
The bulk of the dossier consists of a country-by-country comprehensive assessment of national aspirations, plans and potential capabilities for nuclear energy. The country analyses describe the existing nuclear infrastructure in each member state of ASEAN, including both facilities and institutions; the geopolitical context; the non-proliferation and nuclear safety policies; and, where applicable, the national record in this regard. Given the past nuclear weapons development plans of Australia and the leading role it now plays, together with New Zealand, in nuclear non-proliferation and global disarmament efforts, these nations are included among the country analyses.
Vietnam is likely to be the first in Southeast Asia to develop nuclear energy, owing to a combination of low domestic resistance, strong leadership commitment and foreign support. Hanoi is still in the early stages of implementing its nuclear-energy plans, however, and faces significant capacity constraints. Although the initial target of bringing two nuclear reactors online by 2020 appears feasible, the large-scale financing required for nuclear-power projects makes it unlikely that Vietnam will be able to meet all of its future targets.
Vietnam’s current nuclear activities and plans, its benign policy of regional engagement, and its commitment to non-proliferation all suggest that its nuclear aspirations are entirely peaceful. This is not for a lack of proliferation drivers. In fact, the combination of factors that have been identified as sparking proliferation decisions elsewhere have been historically present in Vietnam, and yet its leaders have forgone the nuclear-weapons option. Proliferation pressures are currently held in check by a network of regional organisations and institutions, and by growing bilateral relationships with the US and India. If these dynamics continue, the main risks from Vietnam’s nuclear programme are the potential for nuclear accidents and theft of sensitive materials. Whether Vietnam’s one-party political system can produce an independent regulatory system for nuclear energy may be its greatest challenge.
Indonesia used to be considered the most likely state in the region to first introduce nuclear power, but domestic opposition has slowed down its plans. Should Indonesia proceed with its ambitious nuclear-energy plans, it will start from a position of technical strength, with five decades of experience in the nuclear sciences, an extensive nuclear infrastructure supported by research institutes, and a cadre of trained, albeit ageing, personnel. However, no final decisions have yet been made, and arrangements appear to be on hold. The strong ‘not in my backyard’ stance of local communities in what is now a decentralised, democratic country, and real concerns over inadequate attention to safety and security, have put Indonesia’s nuclear-energy plans in some doubt.
If Indonesia does commit to nuclear power, it will undoubtedly be mindful of the need to instil a strong and enduring safety culture, with full attention to seismic risks and potential terrorist threats. Given Jakarta’s non-proliferation leadership, the dangers of non-peaceful use are not of significant concern.
Thailand, after several aborted attempts during the past 50 years, today also is on the brink of launching a nuclear power programme. Bangkok’s rationale for developing nuclear energy is entirely benign: a desire for greater energy security combined with concerns over the environmental impact of burning fossil fuels, and a sense of competition with Vietnam. Thailand’s proposed schedule of generating 2,000MWe of nuclear power by 2020 and another 2,000MWe in the year afterward is probably unrealistic, however. Given the embryonic state of Thailand’s nuclear infrastructure and its dependence on extensive foreign assistance, the nation may not yet be ready to introduce nuclear power. Budgetary constraints, public scepticism, legislative hurdles and foreign investors’ concerns about political instability and liability are likely to be problematic.
Malaysia’s intention to develop a nuclear-energy programme, although still at an early stage, appears to be strong, driven by concerns about fossil-fuel limitations and a perceived need for new energy sources. Whether Malaysia also feels a need to keep up with ASEAN neighbours who are further advanced in their nuclear-power plans is unclear. The government is believed to have made a decision on nuclear energy, as yet unannounced. Regardless of what it decides about nuclear technology for itself, Malaysia also should introduce modern strategic trade controls so that its industrial sector will no longer be exploited to support nuclear proliferation elsewhere.
Myanmar has no known capabilities that would lend themselves to a nuclear-weapons programme apart from limited uranium deposits and some personnel who have received nuclear training overseas. Russia agreed in 2007 to provide a small research reactor and associated training, but the contract has not yet been finalised and no construction has begun. If it is built, the 10MWt reactor would not produce enough plutonium to be a proliferation risk and any attempt to divert plutonium from it would almost certainly be detected by the IAEA.
The concern is whether Myanmar might take the road Syria appears to have taken by building secret facilities. With sufficient foreign help in the complex technologies and equipment required for nuclear weapons, lack of indigenous technical capabilities would not be an insurmountable hurdle. Nor, despite the huge investment required for nuclear weapons, would Myanmar’s relative poverty be a deal-breaker. The question hinges more on political decisions. In this regard, there is insufficient information to make a well-founded judgement about Myanmar’s nuclear intentions and a possible North Korea connection.
Since 2008, however, concerned governments and international organisations appear to be giving this matter a higher priority and making greater efforts to test the claims of defectors. There is a growing international determination to be alert to signals about nuclear-weapons programmes that in some countries elsewhere were overlooked until it was too late.
Conclusions
The final chapter assesses various policy options that can contribute towards the peaceful and safe introduction of nuclear energy in the region. Such policies include accepting full transparency measures, making use of market-based fuel-cycle services backed by international guarantees, and working towards a regional solution to spent-fuel storage. Such policies would obviate any need for sensitive dual-use technologies that could spark proliferation concerns.
Regional cooperation in the field of nuclear energy can provide strong benefits. To date, the regional institutions that might be expected to play a greater role in promoting nuclear safety, security and non-proliferation have been underutilised and in some cases ignored. This is due in part to disagreement among member states as to whether regional or global bodies dealing with these issues better serve respective national interests. There is also an inclination to avoid troublesome issues and interference in their neighbours’ business.
The question of whether there should be a region-wide approach to nuclear-energy issues has in some sense been answered in the affirmative through adoption of the Bangkok Treaty with its respective articles covering basic undertakings and information exchange, and through the 2007 decision by the ASEAN leaders to establish a regional nuclear-safety regime. However, cooperation to date has been insufficient. Two years after the 2007 decision to establish a nuclear-safety regime, the member states have not yet been able to agree on terms of reference, because some countries object to the word ‘regime’.
If ASEAN is to evolve into more of a European Union-type regional community, its members will need to share some level of national control over selective economic sectors. Just as Euratom was an initial plank in the construction of the EU, so a regional approach to nuclear-energy development and regulation could be a stepping stone to Southeast Asia regional integration as well as providing for economies of scale, enhanced safety and greater transparency. Coordinating more closely on nuclear safety, security and non-proliferation would be a concrete step towards meeting the ASEAN commitment to establish a ‘security community’ by 2015. The potential for such coordination is also clear. In contrast to many other regions of the world, Southeast Asia enjoys a commitment to regional cooperation, a stable security environment, and sustained economic growth built on solid foundations. This uniquely positive region can further benefit by working together regionally on nuclear energy issues, sharing experiences and being open about mistakes.
Some steps should be taken immediately. At a minimum, it would make sense for ASEAN members to share information about nuclear-development plans, as would seem to be required by the Bangkok Treaty Article 11 commitment for each state party to report on ‘any significant event within its territory … affecting the implementation of this Treaty’. Myanmar’s nuclear agreement with Russia and any strategic discussions with North Korea would appear to fall under this obligation to report.
One alternative for small and new nuclear countries is to create a partnership to jointly manage nuclear multinational waste disposal on a regional basis, including by interim storage for 50-100 years while technology evolves to make recycling or other options more practical and proliferation risk-free. By banding together on a waste-management solution, countries could minimise the costs and optimise non-proliferation, safety and security objectives. Further down the road, the successful introduction of an extra-national fuel-cycle facility serving Southeast Asia would potentially have benefits far beyond the regional advantages of spent-fuel management and non-proliferation of sensitive technologies. It could create a useful model for emulation elsewhere and bring closer to realisation the vision of making all sensitive nuclear facilities international, and thus bring closer as well the vision of a stable nuclear-weapons-free world.
